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Abstract
Network coding allows to increase the throughput as well as the robustness of data transmissions. Regarding robustness, especially
rateless network coding was shown to be beneﬁcial. However, the vulnerability of mere network coding against attacks requires
introducing security mechanisms, and as known, security implies costs. Within this paper, we evaluate the eﬃciency of secure
network coding schemes applied in a rateless manner. Our results show that secure rateless network coding schemes can still
outperform routing. The actual eﬃciency depends on parameters like generation size, packet size, or network topology. Since con-
ﬂicting eﬃciency parameters cannot be fulﬁlled in equal measure, selection of a secure network coding scheme and its parameters
should be done adapted to the actual communication requirements.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
Network coding [1] is a promising approach for increasing throughput, energy eﬃciency, and robustness of data
transmission, hence, its use in various contexts was investigated [2–4]. In contrast to common routing, nodes in the
network do not only forward data packets, rather, they compute linear combinations of the data packets they receive.
Usually, data to be transmitted is organized in generations [2]. If the size of the generation equals the network capacity,
the whole generation can be transmitted at once from the sender (source) to the recipients (sinks).
In the rateless scenario, the sender sends linear combinations computed from the data packets of one generation
until he gets acknowledgments from all recipients. Possibilities for rateless network coding and for managing this
feedback have been studied, e.g., in [5–7]; but these studies do not focus on secure network coding schemes.
However, the vulnerability of network coding against various passive as well as active attacks requires introducing
security mechanisms. Since especially the pollution of data packets is critical due to its damaging inﬂuence on the
subsequent processing, we focus on schemes providing security against this type of attack. Numerous approaches for
detecting polluted packets have been published. Of course, security increases costs, e.g., in terms of communication or
computation overhead. To the best of our knowledge, the existing evaluations of the performance of rateless network
coding do not explicitly consider secure network coding schemes.
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The contribution of this paper is to provide results regarding the eﬃciency of selected secure network coding
schemes applied in a rateless manner. Particularly, we consider the dependency of eﬃciency parameters on the
generation size, packet size, and network topology. Our results indicate that rateless network coding still provides
beneﬁts if security mechanisms are introduced. Since the eﬃciency parameters may be contradictory, selecting a
network coding approach and setting the necessary parameters should be done adaptively.
The paper is organized as follows. The selected network coding schemes are sketched in Section 2. In Section 3,
we describe the test settings and experiments. Subsequently, the results of the experiments are discussed in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 concludes and gives an outlook.
2. Selected approaches for secure network coding
The common notation of network coding is based on a directed, acyclic graph G = (V,E) with a set of nodes
(vertices) V and a set of links (edges) E. In the multicast scenario also considered in this paper, a sender S ∈ V
transmits data packets over forwarders Fi ∈ V to a number of recipients Ri ∈ V (Fig. 1). The forwarders compute
linear combinations from the data packets xi = (xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,n) ∈ Fnq they receive over their l incoming edges
y =
l∑
i=1
αixi (1)
and send these combinations over their outgoing edges to successive nodes. The recipients can decode the original
data by solving a system of linear equations once they received a suﬃcient number of linear independent data packets.
In random linear network coding (RLNC), the nodes randomly select the linear coeﬃcients αi ∈ Fq. The ap-
proaches we have selected for our evaluations are based on Practical Network Coding (PNC, introduced in [2]), a
practical implementation of RLNC. In PNC, data to be sent is divided into data packets pi = (pi,1, pi,2, ..., pi,m) ∈ Fmq .
These data packets are amended by a unit vector (βi,1, βi,2, ..., βi,h) ∈ Fhq that represents the global encoding vector
GEV. The resulting data packets of n = h+m symbols are organized in matrices called generations. Only data packets
from one generation can be combined. Therefore, data packets are tagged with a generation identiﬁer gid that needs
to be unique within the system. One generation contains h data packets, hence, h represents the generation size.
The network capacity C (max-ﬂow min-cut, [1]) represents the amount of data that can be transmitted to the
recipients at once in the multicast scenario. In rateless network coding, the sender sends data packets until he gets
acknowledgments from all recipients conﬁrming the successful delivery of the data packets. In this scenario, the
generation size can be chosen independent from the network capacity. The generation size obviously inﬂuences
the eﬃciency of network coding, e.g., while a larger generation size increases the throughput, it also increases the
decoding delay [5].
Since network coding in its basic form is vulnerable against attacks, the introduction of security mechanisms have
to be considered. Pollution attacks are especially critical since polluted packets that are included into the linear
combinations inﬂuence the whole subsequent processing and may prevent decoding in the worst case. Hence, various
approaches have been introduced in the literature that aim at preventing the success of such pollution attacks.
Within this paper, we focus on approaches based on cryptography that enable intermediate nodes in the network to
detect and discard polluted data packets that do not belong to the linear span of the valid data packets. Generally, the
sender computes information necessary for verifying the validity of the data packets. For our evaluations, we selected
four schemes that represent diﬀerent approaches (for more details, we refer to the cited articles as well as [8]):
Homomorphic hashes (HH): As an example, we selected the approach introduced by Li et al. [9]. The sender
computes hash values for all packets of the generations to be sent during a session with session identiﬁer sid. The
authenticity of the hash values is ensured by means of digital signatures. Due to the homomorphic property, interme-
diate nodes can check the validity of received packets by comparing the hash for the combined data packets to the
combination of the original hash values.
Homomorphic signatures (HS): The sender computes one homomorphic signature for each data packet. The sig-
natures are included in the data packets. Since they are homomorphic, a valid signature for a combined data packet
can be computed by appropriately combining the signatures of the corresponding data packets. As an example, we
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selected the scheme introduced by Catalano et al. [10]. In that scheme, homomorphic signatures are computed over
bilinear groups.
Homomorphic MACs (Message Authentication Codes; HM): This approach is based on symmetric cryptography,
i.e., sender and verifying nodes must share a key. In the selected approach [11], the sender computes a number of
MACs for each data packet. The number of MACs per packet depends on the length T of the maximum path between
sender and recipient. The sender ﬁrst generates a chain of seed values and sends the digitally signed last values of
this chain, the chain commitment bc, to the verifying nodes. These seeds are used to derive the symmetric keys for
computing the MACs. After sending data packets, the sender also successively sends the seeds. A verifying node
checks the authenticity of the seeds by means of the signed chain commitment, derives the symmetric key and checks
the last MAC of the data packet. In case of a successful veriﬁcation, this MAC is removed; i.e, the number k of MACs
per data packet decreases. After this step, data packets as well as homomorphic MACs are linearly combined and sent
to subsequent nodes.
Authenticated Checksums (DART): The basic idea is that the veriﬁcation information is sent after the data packets
have been received. In the selected example introduced in [12], the sender periodically computes and distributes
checksums that are also homomorphic. The forwarders have to store data packets until they get a digitally signed
checksum sent after they received the data packet. A combined packet is valid if the checksum for this packet equals
the result of applying the linear combinations to the checksum sent by the sender.
Except HM, these secure network coding schemes can be used in a rateless manner without modiﬁcations. The
problem for HM is that seeds once published are no longer secret, i.e, they cannot be used again. To enable veriﬁcation
of all messages of a generation, we introduced batches for a generation. The size of a batch equals the number of
outgoing edges of the sender. For each batch with identiﬁer bid, the sender computes MACs using fresh keys based
on one chain that must now contain more values. Thus, the signed chain commitment bc has to be sent only once.
The selected network coding schemes were compared to routing the data packets applying a sliding window ap-
proach (RT, [13]) and to network coding without security measures (PNC, [2]). RT does not contain security measures,
hence, the eﬃciency parameters for this approach mainly serve as a comparison to PNC.
3. Evaluations
3.1. Simulation Environment and Assumptions Regarding the Schemes
Implementing the selected schemes requires deﬁning a packet format and the size of the data ﬁelds (Tab. 1). The
size of the underlying ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq, q = 2σ was set according to the size suggested by the authors of the schemes.
This parameter determines the symbol size σ of encoding coeﬃcients and data symbols. Regarding the size of the
cryptographically computed information, we followed suggestions by NIST to ensure a similar security level for the
schemes [14]. If the veriﬁcation information is directly contained in the data packet, the size of this value is given in
the last column.
Table 1. Packet format for the selected network coding schemes.
Approach σ Packet type Packet content Packet authentication
PNC 8 bit data type, gid, h, m, GEV, data —
HH 257 bit data type, gid, GEV, data veriﬁcation packets
veriﬁcation type, sid, h, m, param, gids and hom. hashes (h · 1024 bit) signature (2048 bit)
HS 224 bit data type, gid, h, m, GEV, data hom. signature (456 bit)
HM 112 bit data type, gid, bid, k, GEV, data hom. MACs (k · 112 bit)
seeds type, gid, bid, seed chain commitment
chain commitment type, gid, m, n, param, bc signature (2048 bit)
DART 8 bit data type, gid, GEV, data checksum packet
checksum type, gid, h, m, param, checksum signature (2048 bit)
The packet format should allow using diﬀerent schemes. Hence, forwarding nodes as well as recipients must be
able to recognize the selected scheme and relevant parameters. Consequently, all data packets contain a ﬁeld type
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(1 byte) that encodes the selected scheme. Additionally, the data packets contain parameters required by the schemes
(e.g., security parameters) or necessary for an implementation (e.g., the number of packets per generation h). Since it
is not possible to discuss these speciﬁc parameters in detail, we summarized them with param in Tab. 1. Data packets
for RT just contain the type, a packet identiﬁer, the number of data symbols and the data symbols with σ = 8 bit.
The selected approaches for secure network coding were implemented based on the network simulation framework
ns-3 [15]. The network coding functionality was implemented using the C++ library NTL [16] that provides function-
ality for eﬃcient computations in ﬁnite ﬁelds. Furthermore, the library PBC [17] was used for computations based on
elliptic curves applied in HS. Digital signatures were computed by means of RSA as provided in OpenSSL [18].
3.2. Eﬃciency Parameters and Experiments
For evaluating the eﬃciency of the secure network coding schemes in the rateless scenario, we measured multiple
parameters. Within this paper, we present results for parameters that correlate to the delay and the energy consumption:
• The throughput reﬂects the data rate and is computed as ratio of payload to transmission time.
• The relative payload equals the ratio of payload to the overall data to be sent (including, e.g., encoding coeﬃ-
cients and digital signatures). If data are transmitted multiple times, they are considered as redundant data. A
high relative payload allows for a high throughput.
• The number of send operations reﬂects the number of data packets to be sent in the whole network by the sender
as well as by the forwarders. Such a value is especially of interest if we consider the energy consumption per
send operation.
• The decoding delay represents the transmission time of a whole generation, i.e., the time to transmit enough
linear independent data packets to the recipients so that they could start to decode by solving the system of
linear equations. Computation time needed for decoding is not included.
These eﬃciency parameters were determined for the selected schemes considering diﬀerent conditions (selected
results are presented in Sec. 4):
Inﬂuence of generation size. In the ﬁrst series of tests, we evaluated the dependence of the eﬃciency parameters on
the generation size. For the corresponding simulation runs, we worked with network model 1 (Fig. 1a): The sender
(S ) transmits the data packets to four recipients (Ri). On each intermediate level i, there are four intermediate nodes
(Fi, j). Within these tests, we considered the transmission of 200 kByte data using a packet size of 1400 byte. The
generation size was set to values in the range between 2 and 50.
S
F1,1 F1,2 F1,3 F1,4
F2,1 F2,2 F2,3 F2,4
R1 R2 R3 R4
(a) Model 1
S
F1,1 F1,2
F−1,1 F−1,2
R1 R2
(b) Model 2
S
F1,1 F1,2 F1,3 F1,4
F2,1 F2,2 F2,3 F2,4
R1 R2 R3 R4
(c) Model 3
Fig. 1. Network models used for the evaluations.
Inﬂuence of packet size. The packet size obviously inﬂuences the payload per packet, hence, it also inﬂuences the
number of send operations and the throughput. The goal of the second series of tests was to determine concrete
values for this dependency. Again, we worked with network model 1 (Fig. 1a). The eﬃciency parameters have been
evaluated for sending 100 kByte data using a packet size of 700 byte and for sending 400 kByte data using a packet
size of 2800 byte.
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Inﬂuence of network topology. The inﬂuence of the network topology was studied by varying (1) the number of hops
between sender and recipients, and (2) the network capacity. For the ﬁrst issue, network model 2 was used (Fig. 1b). In
these experiments, 200 kByte data was sent using a packet size of 1400 byte, and the path length was varied between
2 and 16. To focus on the inﬂuence of the path length, the generation size was set to the most eﬃcient value according
to the results of the ﬁrst series of tests. Increasing the network capacity will improve the eﬃciency of network coding.
For evaluating the inﬂuence of this parameter, we evaluated sending 200 kByte of data considering network model 3
(Fig. 1c) that provides a network capacity of C = 4 and compared the results to the results using model 1 with C = 2.
4. Results
4.1. Inﬂuence of Generation Size
At ﬁrst, raising the generation size increases the relative payload for all schemes (Fig 2a). The sender sends data
packets until he gets acknowledgements. Sending data packets as well as acknowledgements needs some time, hence,
the ratio of repeatedly sent data packets decreases with growing generation size. However, for HH, HS, and HM,
there is only an increase up to a generation size of 10 or 12, respectively; for larger generations, the relative payload
decreases. The number of encoding coeﬃcients depends on the generation size h, and since the symbol size has to
be increased for these schemes, the payload per data packet is drastically reduced. Actually, there is a maximum
possible generation size of 44 or 41, respectively, for HS and HH. HM provides a higher relative payload than HH
and HS, since in contrast to these schemes, the sender can only send until the ﬁrst seed packet was delivered. Hence,
the number of redundant data packets reduces.
(a) Relative payload (b) Number of send operations
(c) Throughput (d) Decoding delay
Fig. 2. Results for the inﬂuence of the generation size. The ﬁgures show results for a packet size of 1400 byte and 200 kByte payload.
The number of send operations heavily depends on the relative payload since more packets have to be sent with
decreasing payload per data packet (Fig. 2b). Secure schemes generally need more send operation than RT since
additional information has to be sent; only PNC outperforms RT for a generation size of 8 or more.
The throughput also depends on the relative payload (Fig. 2c). Only results for HM are worse due to the waiting
periods. DART outperforms RT for a generation size of 30 or more; the checksum packets are small and do not have
such a strong inﬂuence. The throughput for HH and HS signiﬁcantly decreases with increasing generation size due to
the drastically reduced payload. Hence, these schemes cannot outperform RT regarding throughput.
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The decoding delay generally increases with growing generation size since more data packets have to be sent
before decoding can start. The best secure scheme is HS that causes a decoding delay similar to PNC. The other
secure schemes imply bigger decoding delays since additional packets have to be sent before or after the data packets.
The strongest increase of the decoding delay was measured for HM since a generation was sent in batches and each
batch implies waiting periods.
4.2. Inﬂuence of Packet Size
An increased packet size provides a larger payload per data packet. Especially schemes that require increasing the
symbol size beneﬁt from larger packets. Consequently, the throughput is also improved (Fig. 3a, 3b). The bigger
the payload, the more data can be veriﬁed. For HM, this beneﬁt cannot be observed since increased packet size also
increases the time periods between sending seed packets and, hence, increases waiting periods.
(a) Throughput (700 byte) (b) Throughput (2800 byte)
(c) Decoding delay (700 byte) (d) Decoding delay (2800 byte)
Fig. 3. Results for the inﬂuence of the packet size. Figures (a,c) show results for a packet size of 700 byte. Figures (b,d) show corresponding results
for a packet size of 2800 byte.
A drawback of using a larger packet size is the increased decoding delay (Fig. 3c, 3d). Of course, sending larger
data packets require more time so that recipients have to wait longer until they get enough linear independent data
packets. Moreover, the computing time for decoding will also increase.
4.3. Inﬂuence of Network Topology
Inﬂuence of longest path. For these tests, the generation size was set to the most eﬃcient values according to the
results of the ﬁrst experiments: h = 50 (PNC, DART), 12 (HS), 10 (HS), and 6 (HM). The length of the path between
sender and recipient determines the transmission time. Since the sender continuously sends until getting acknowledg-
ments in the rateless scenario, there are more redundant data with increasing path length. Consequently, the relative
payload decreases (Fig. 4a). The relative payload of HM additionally decreases since the number of MACs per data
packet depends on the length of the path. However, due to the waiting periods, the inﬂuence of this eﬀect is moderated.
A longer path increases the number of send operations for all schemes (Fig. 4b). One reason is that more nodes
are involved in the transmission process, and all these nodes have to forward the packets. Additionally, since the
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(a) Relative payload (b) Number of send operations
(c) Throughput (d) Delay
Fig. 4. Results for the inﬂuence of the longest path. The ﬁgures show results for a packet size of 1400 byte and 200 kByte payload.
acknowledgments are received later, more redundant data packets are sent. Again, this eﬀect is moderated for HM
due to the waiting periods. However, if there is a longer path, more seed packets have to be sent and, hence, the
number of send operations increases even stronger than for the other schemes.
For all schemes except HM, the relative payload has the most signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the throughput (Fig. 4c).
The throughput of HM also decreases if the path gets longer, but the main reason are the high waiting periods for the
sender before the next batch can be sent.
The increase of the decoding delay with growing path length is quite moderate for PNC, HH, and HS (Fig. 4d).
However, schemes based on time asymmetry show a signiﬁcant increase of the decoding delay since there are always
waiting periods until a forwarder can verify and further process a data packet. The inﬂuence is especially strong for
HM, since the sender processes a generation batch by batch.
Inﬂuence of network capacity. As expected, a network with a larger network capacity increases the eﬃciency. The
results also show that the generation size should be a multiple of the maximum ﬂow to best utilize the potential
beneﬁts. Otherwise, redundant data packets are sent and as a consequence, the relative payload does not increase.
Again, the increased relative payload improves the throughput of the schemes (Fig. 5b). An exception is HM,
caused by the waiting periods. The other schemes can outperform routing given a suitable generation size. While HH
and HS are again limited by the signiﬁcantly increased size of the GEV, DART generally provides a better throughput
than RT for a generation size larger than 12.
5. Conclusion
Our evaluations have shown that rateless secure network coding can still outperform routing even if the rateless
mode signiﬁcantly inﬂuences the eﬃciency of these schemes. An important factor is that some schemes require
to increase the symbol size what implies a signiﬁcantly increase of the GEV. Given a ﬁxed packet size, the relative
payload decreases, consequently, also the other eﬃciency parameters are inﬂuenced. However, the results also depend
on the network topology – while longer paths between sender and recipient have a negative inﬂuence on the eﬃciency,
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(a) Relative payload (C = 4) (b) Throughput (C = 4)
Fig. 5. Results for a network capacity of C = 4. Figures (2a, 2c) show corresponding results for a network capacity of C = 2.
a higher network capacity improves eﬃciency. Further, the eﬃciency can still be inﬂuenced by choosing a suitable
packet size – taking into account that a larger packet size increases the decoding delay.
To conclude, it is not possible to determine a secure network coding scheme that performs best under all conditions
and regarding all eﬃciency parameters. The scheme and its parameters should be chosen adaptively depending on the
application requirements as well as on the network topology. Especially generation size and packet size (if possible)
should be set appropriately.
Further work has to be done to consider the eﬃciency of rateless secure network coding schemes in case of possible
attacks. If there is packet loss, redundant packets will improve the eﬃciency in comparison to routing. Additionally,
possibilities for optimizing the network coding schemes should be taken into consideration, like pipelining gener-
ations. Finally, recommendations regarding a best suited scheme should also take into account further eﬃciency
parameters or system restrictions, such as memory or computational power.
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